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INTEREST OF AM1CI CURIAE 
ANR Production Company, CIG Exploration, Inc. and Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation 
are each Delaware corporations qualified to do business in the State of Utah. Each of Amid 
hold oil and gas leases issued by the Division of Lands and Forestry of the Department of 
Natural Resources of the State of Utah (the "Division") covering and affecting public lands 
owned by the State. CIG Exploration, Inc. and Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation are currently 
parties to a proceeding pending before the Division concerning the precise issue presented in this 
case, that is, whether royalties are owed to the State of Utah under applicable law for 
reimbursed ad valorem and severance taxes1. In addition, one or more of Amid have similar 
issues pending before the Division. Further, Amid, as some of the largest producers of natural 
gas in the State of Utah, are vitally interested in the orderly and consistent development of oil 
and gas law in the states in which they do business. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
(i) Utah Code Ann. §65-l-18(2)(a) (1953), repealed and reenacted in part at §65A-6-
4, (1988). 
(ii) The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§3301-3432, specifically, 15 
U.S.C. §3320; and 
(iii) Utah Property Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. §§59-2-101 to —1372 (1987 & Supp. 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(i) Did the District Court err in finding that reference to "gross value" in Utah Code 
Ann. §65-1-18 (1953) (repealed, 1988) includes ad valorem tax reimbursements which Appellant 
lSee Notice of Agency Action 91-0213-COASTAL AUDIT dated March 11, 1991. The amounts 
alleged to be owed have been paid under protest. In addition, that administrative proceeding has been 
stayed by agreement of the parties pending disposition of the instant case by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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receives for the sale of its own production and in finding that such tax reimbursements are 
therefore subject to royalty? 
(ii) Did the District Court err in finding that reference to "market value" in the 
royalty clauses contained in the oil and gas leases subject to this dispute included ad valorem tax 
reimbursements which Appellant receives for its own production and in finding that such tax 
reimbursements were therefore subject to royalty? 
(iii) Did the District Court err in finding that its ruling as described in paragraphs (i) 
and (ii) above was not consistent with federal or state law? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The facts in this case and the synopsis of the proceedings below have been ably set forth 
in the Brief of Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company and, for the sake of brevity, will not be 
repeated here. By Corrected Minute Entry dated January 24, 1992, the Motion to File Brief of 
Amici Curiae was granted. The brief is to be filed by March 2, 1992. In addition, Amici were 
granted the opportunity to participate in oral argument for a total of ten minutes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At issue in this case is whether the State of Utah may claim royalties under applicable 
law and the terms of oil and gas leases covering public domain properties owned by the State 
with respect to tax reimbursements received by its lessees for taxes which were only assessed 
against the lessee's non-exempt, taxable share of production. 
It is the position of Amici that, because the State's reserved royalty share of production 
is not subject to taxation, any reimbursements from taxes borne by the lessee with respect to its 
share of production do not constitute any part of the gross value of the State's royalty share, and 
that, accordingly, royalties may not be permissibly charged against reimbursements received by 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the lessee. The inclusion of such reimbursements in the royalty value of the State's share of 
production causes the State's royalty share of production to impermissibly exceed the statutorily 
mandated maximum of l2Vi percent. Further, any such construction causes the price received 
for the sale of the State's share of production to exceed the federally imposed maximum lawful 
price. Finally, any construction of the so-called "federal-floor" provision of the State's lease 
form which is essence adopts by reference the complex web of statutes, regulations, 
interpretations, and policies applicable to valuation of production from federal lands exceeds 
legislative authorization and can only lead to confusion, conflict, and litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Inclusion Of Tax Reimbursements In The Value Of The Tax Exempt 
Royalty Share Of Production Impermissibly Causes The State Of Utah's 
Reserved Royalty Share Of Production To Exceed The Statutory Maximum 
Of 12% Percent. 
As more particularly set forth in Appellant's Brief (See Brief of Appellant at pp. 13-16), 
the royalty share of production reserved by the Division of State Lands and Forestry is a 
separate and distinct interest in real property and in the oil and gas production appurtenant 
thereto. The inclusion of ad valorem tax reimbursements in the royalty value of such production 
contravenes the express language of Utah Code Ann. §65-1-18 that" . . . royalty shall not exceed 
12V2 percent of the gross value of the product at the point of shipment from the leased 
premises." Utah Code Ann. §65-1-18 (1953), (repealed, 1988) (emphasis supplied). By 
including in the value of the tax exempt royalty share of production the reimbursements for taxes 
attributable to the non-exempt, working interest share of production, the Division of Lands and 
Forestry impermissibly causes the State's reserved royalty share of production to exceed the 
statutorily established maximum of 12V6 percent. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
By way of example, assume that a well located on lands covered by an oil and gas lease 
from the State of Utah produced 1000 units of natural gas which are sold at $4.00 per unit. 
Assume further that there are assessments of ad valorem and severance taxes totalling 10 
percent. Only the non-exempt working interest share of production is subject to taxation. The 
purchaser agrees to reimburse the producer for the taxes assessed against the working interest. 
Under these facts, the State of Utah's royalty share of production should not exceed a 
maximum of l2Vi percent of the production, or 125 units. Since each unit is sold for $4.00 per 
unit, the State would thus be entitled to a maximum royalty of $4.00/unit x 125 units, or 
$500.00. 
But if the value of the reimbursed taxes attributable to the non-exempt working interest 
is allocated in part to the tax exempt royalty share of production, the State's royalty share 
impermissibly exceeds l2Vi percent. Assume the same facts as above. 1000 units are sold at 
$4.00, or for a total of $4,000.00. The purchaser also reimburses the producer who actually 
bore the taxes in question an amount sufficient to pay such taxes, i.e., 10 percent of 7/8 of 
$4.00/unit x 1000 units, or $350.00. (The 7/8 share is the non-exempt working interest portion 
of production.) 
In the State's view, it is thus entitled to 12.5 percent of $4,350.00, or $543.75. But as 
seen above, the State's share of production, i.e., 125 units, could only be sold for $500.00. 
Thus, the State, through this legerdemain, has increased its royalty share from the 
maximum permissible statutory rate of 12.5 percent to, in this example, 13.59 percent (i.e., the 
$543.75 alleged "value" of the State's royalty share as a percentage of the total sum of $4000.00 
realized upon the sale of the production in question.) It is clear that in the event the State took 
its royalty share of production in kind and marketed that production for its own account, it 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would not be allowed to receive the proceeds from the sale of any volume of production in 
excess of 12!/2 percent, or 125 units. But because the producer markets the State's share of 
production, even where that production is sold under arrangements in which both the royalty 
share and the working interest share realize the same per unit sums, the producer finds itself 
bearing an additional royalty burden in excess of that for which it contracted and in excess of 
the statutory maximum. 
B. The Decision Below Is Contrary To Law Because It Requires The Payment 
Of Royalties On A Value That Exceeds The Maximum Lawful Price For 
Which The State's Royalty Share of Gas Could Have Been Sold. 
Prior to enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act ("NGPA") in 1978, federal price 
controls were imposed only on sales of gas in interstate commerce. As a result, prices for gas 
sold in that market were kept relatively low, while prices for gas sold in the intrastate market 
continued to rise as the demand for gas increased. This, in turn, led to sharp pipeline delivery 
curtailments in the lower-priced interstate market during the natural gas shortages of the early 
1970's. See generally, Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast. Inc. v. United 
Distribution Companies. 112 L. Ed 2d 636, 111 S.Ct. 615 (U.S. 1991). 
In the NGPA, Congress sought to correct this imbalance (1) by subjecting all wellhead 
sales of gas to federal price controls, regardless of whether the gas was sold in the interstate or 
intrastate market, and (2) by replacing the cost-based ceiling prices that were established by the 
Federal Power Commission with incentive-based price ceilings imposed by Congress. With 
regard to the incentive pricing structure of the NGPA, the Fifth Circuit recently explained: 
[T]he NGPA set price ceilings on gas depending on when or how the gas was 
produced. Newer, harder to produce gas commanded higher price ceilings while 
older gas already under production was pegged with lower price ceilings. 
Congress had, through the pricing provisions of the NGPA. sought to balance the 
interests of the consumer by keeping old gas prices low while at the same time 
encouraging the development of new reserves through incentive pricing. 
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Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast. Inc. v. FERC. 885 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.1989), 
at 214 (emphasis added). 
As part of this incentive-based statutory scheme, Congress allowed first sellers of natural 
gas to recover, in addition to the price ceilings imposed by the NGPA, certain reimbursements 
of post-production costs and expenses. Among the reimbursements allowed were 
reimbursements for state severance and ad valorem taxes (referred to in the statute and 
hereinafter collectively as "severance taxes"). This allowance, however, was strictly limited to 
the amount "necessary to recover" severance taxes actually "borne by the seller." Under Section 
110 of the NGPA: 
[A] price for the first sale of natural gas shall not be considered to exceed the 
maximum lawful price applicable to the first sale of such natural gas under this 
part if such first sale price exceeds the maximum lawful price to the extent 
necessary to recover. — 
(1) State severance taxes attributable to the production of such natural gas and 
borne by the seller, but only to the extent the amount of such taxes does not 
exceed the limitation of subsection (b) of this section; . . . 
15 U.S.C. §3320 (emphasis added). 
By allowing the recovery of these cost reimbursements, Congress accomplished two 
things. First, it made marginal properties more economic to produce. Thus, an incentive was 
provided for the production of natural gas that otherwise might not have been produced. 
Additionally, however, the interests of the consumer were protected since only those costs that 
were actually incurred could be reimbursed. 
In the royalty context, this means that private lessors who pay severance taxes could 
receive reimbursements for their out-of-pocket costs. Lessees likewise could receive 
reimbursements since they too pay severance taxes with respect to their working interest share 
of the gas. Since severance taxes are neither assessed nor paid with respect to the State's royalty 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
share, however, no reimbursements are allowed — only the federally-mandated ceiling price can 
be collected for the sale of the government's royalty gas. 
First, under the statutory scheme of the NGPA, severance tax reimbursements have 
nothing to do with the value of gas. The reimbursements are allowed, not as part of the price 
for the sale of gas, but as a special incentive to encourage the production of gas that might not 
otherwise be produced. The Department's decision is therefore contrary to law because it 
requires the payment of royalties on something other than the value of "production" and because 
it undermines the incentive purposes of the NGPA. 
Second, the Department's decision is contrary to law because it requires the payment of 
royalties on a value that exceeds the maximum lawful price for which the government's royalty 
share of the gas could have been sold. As previously noted, the government is entitled to a 
percentage share of the production. This percentage share of the production can be taken either 
in amount or in value; however, when the government elects to take its royalty in value, the 
government is entitled only to the value of its royalty share of the production. Here, the value 
of its royalty gas could only have been the ceiling price since no tax reimbursements were 
received or could have been received with respect to the government's royalty gas. 
Finally, even if the Department could lawfully claim a royalty based on the value of tax 
reimbursements collected by others, it must also take into consideration the costs that these 
others incurred in order to obtain those tax reimbursements. This is because the value of 
production for royalty purposes is determined at the well, and because the payment of severance 
taxes is a post-production cost that is properly deducted in determining the wellhead value of 
production. 
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It should be remembered that the reimbursements received by the producer are in fact 
just that; i.e., reimbursements for costs actually incurred. The producer realizes the same $4.00 
per unit that the State receives for its share of production. While it may receive the 
reimbursement, it must also pay the identical amount for taxes to the State's taxing authorities. 
Severance tax reimbursements were allowed by Congress in Section 110 of the NGPA, not as 
a part of the price that could be paid for the sale of gas, but as an incentive to encourage the 
production of gas that might not otherwise have been produced. While the ceiling price 
categories of the NGPA are also incentive-based, a clear distinction is drawn in the act between 
cost reimbursements and ceiling prices. The ceiling prices are generally applicable to all gas 
within a particular category. But the allowance of cost reimbursements is strictly limited to 
amounts necessary to allow the seller to recover certain identified costs, and even these costs 
must actually be "borne by the seller." Thus, as is evidenced by the statutory scheme, Congress 
clearly contemplated that the payments allowed by Section 110 of the NGPA would be 
reimbursements for out-of-pocket expenses, not payments for gas. 
By structuring the statutory scheme in this way, Congress intended to ensure that the 
incentive ceiling prices allowed by the act would not be diminished by post-production costs and 
expenses that might make marginal properties uneconomic to produce. At the same time, 
Congress protected the interests of the consumer by ensuring that only those costs that are 
actually "borne by the seller" can be reimbursed. This balance between the incentive purposes 
of the act and the interests of the consumers is now being undermined by the DOI. As Chief 
Judge Seth pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Hoover & Bracken Energies. Inc. v. POL 
723 F.2d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir. 1983) cert, denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93 (1984): 
It was understood that under the Act the Severance taxes would be passed on to 
the consumers. Congress thus balanced the considerations among the lessors, 
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lessees, purchasers and the public. This fixed the public policy considerations 
beyond changes by administrative agencies . . . . Congress also set price ceilings 
and classifications beyond the authority of administrative agencies. The Act thus 
made fundamental changes in the theory of pricing, the method of pricing, the 
handling of severance taxes, and the allocation of authority. The Act thereby 
impacted Interior's formula for royalty calculations. 
In sum, under the statutory scheme of the NGPA, severance tax reimbursements are not 
payments for the sale of gas — they are reimbursements for out-of-pocket costs. Thus, they are 
not royalty-bearing. Moreover, for the Department to require the payment of royalties on costs 
reimbursements would undermine the underlying intent of the NGPA, which was to allow the 
reimbursement of certain costs, in addition to the ceiling price, as an incentive for the production 
of gas that might not otherwise be produced. 
Even if the Department could lawfully claim a royalty based on the value of either total 
unit production or total lease production, if the Department is allowed to claim a portion of the 
reimbursement of taxes paid by others, it must also take into consideration the costs that these 
others incurred in order to obtain those tax reimbursements. This is because production for 
royalty purposes is determined at the well, and because the payment of severance taxes is a post-
production cost that must be deducted from the proceeds received to determine a wellhead value. 
Again, using the example from above: 
the private lessor receives the $4.00 ceiling price + a $.40 tax reimbursement, 
but it pays $.40 in taxes — therefore, the value of the private lessor's royalty 
share of the gas at the well would be $4.00 + $,40 - $.40 = per unit; 
the lessee likewise receives the $4.00 ceiling price + a $.40 tax reimbursement, 
but it also pays $.40 in taxes — therefore, the value of the lessee's working 
interest share of the gas at the well would also be $4.00 per unit. 
Thus, a percentage of the value of total production at the well is the same as the value of the 
government's 1/8 royalty share of the production: 
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1/8 of the proceeds attributable to the State of Utah lease ($4.00 per unit for the 
1000 units produced, i.e., $4000.00) = $500,00: 
the proceeds received for the government's 1/8 share of the production (12.5 units 
x $4.00) = $500.00. 
Under either theory, the royalty payments in this case were correct — the reimbursements 
that they received for the taxes paid on their working interest share of the gas produced from 
their leases were not subject to royalty. 
C. The Inclusion Of A So-Called "Federal Floor" Provision In The State's Lease 
Form Does Not Thereby Incorporate Federal Statutes, Regulations, 
Interpretations, and Policies Concerning Valuation of Federal Royalties. 
Utah Code Ann. §65-1-18 is the statute which governed the issuance of the oil and gas 
leases in question. The statute provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
All mineral leases issued by the Board shall contain such terms and provisions as 
the Board deems to be in the best interest of the State and shall provide for such 
annual rental and for such royalties as the Land Board shall deem fair and in the 
best interest of the State of Utah, but the annual rental shall not be less than 50C 
per acre per annum nor more than $1 per acre per annum and the royalty shall 
not exceed HV2 % of the gross value of the product at the point of shipment from 
the leased premises. 
While the statute provided that lf[A]ll mineral leases issued by the Board shall contain 
such terms and provisions as the Board deems to be in the best interest of the State" and "shall 
provide for . . . such royalties as the Land Board shall deem fair and in the best interest of the 
State of Utah . . .", the statutory delegation is not without limitation. The Board may not 
provide for a royalty in excess of "121/2% of the gross value of the product . . . ." 
Nowhere does the statute suggest that the Board may, in essence, by a single reference 
in the State's lease form to the "price" received by the United States for its production in the 
field thereby cause the statutes, regulations, rules, and policies of another jurisdiction to be read 
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into the State of Utah's oil and gas leases. Yet this is precisely the result that the State urges 
in its reliance upon the so-called "federal floor" provision of its oil and gas leases. 
The leases in question provided, in relevant part, "that in no event shall the price for gas 
be less than that received by the United States of America for its royalties from gas of like grade 
and quantity from the same field." See Exhibit "C", Section 4(c), to Brief of Appellant Enron 
Oil & Gas Company (emphasis supplied). 
There are numerous statutes governing the determination of federal royalty value. See 
generally, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§181-263, the Mineral Leasing 
Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§351-359, the 1938 Omnibus Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§§396(a) - 396(g), the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1331, etseq., and the 
Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, 30 U.S.C. §§1701, et seq. 
In addition to this complex statutory scheme, there exists a complex web of federal 
regulations governing federal royalty valuation. See generally, Subparts C and D of Part 206 
of Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Further, these statutes and regulations are 
subject to a myriad of interpretations, both by the Director of the Minerals Management Service, 
the federal bureau within the Department of the Interior charged with overseeing product 
valuation and royalty collections from federal lands, and by the Interior Board of Land Appeals, 
an adjudicatory tribunal within the Department of the Interior that hears, inter alia, appeals of 
decisions of the Director of the MMS. So extensive is the present jurisprudence governing 
federal royalty valuation that the above-referenced statutory, regulatory and administrative 
authorities are published in a 15 volume loose-leaf service compiled and edited by the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation. See Gower Federal Service. "Royalty Valuation and 
Management", Volume 1-15. 
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It is inconceivable that the legislature, in delegating certain powers to the Board to 
establish "fair" royalties, contemplated that the Board would, in essence, purport to adopt by 
reference in a single phrase in the State's oil and gas lease form the complex statutory and 
regulatory regime applicable to federal lands. Nor could it have envisioned that a lessee of State 
lands, in ascertaining its royalty obligation to the State, would be required to look not to Utah's 
statutes, not to regulations promulgated by the Board, nor even to the terms of its contract with 
the State, but that it would be required to look to the statutes, regulations, and interpretations 
of a federal agency without jurisdiction of any sort over the State lands of the State of Utah. 
The issues raised by any such construction are almost endless. For example, if the 
"federal floor" provision causes federal law to be incorporated into the lease terms, are the 
statutes, regulations, interpretations, and policies of the Interior Department in existence at the 
time of lease issuance to govern, or do evolving federal statutory, regulatory and interpretative 
policies cause the meaning of Utah's leases to vary over time? Conversely, can the Department 
disavow any federal policy or interpretation it does not approve and, if so, under what 
circumstances? As the court can see from these two examples, and from the countless others 
that come easily to mind, any such construction of the language of this lease provision will do 
nothing other than cause uncertainty, engender endless and useless controversy, and foster 
needless litigation. 
Amid therefore strongly urge this court that the implications of this case are both far 
reaching and significant. The Board's attempt to bootstrap itself into a sort of quasi-federal 
agency, despite the lack of legislative authorization, should not be countenanced. No lessee of 
State lands should be expected to anticipate that the voluminous and complex regulatory scheme 
governing federal lands is subsumed within a single phrase buried in the boilerplate of the State's 
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lease form. A more reasoned interpretation of this provision, and, most significantly, one that 
does not result in such obviously unintended consequences, is found in Appellant's Brief at page 
22, paragraph B.3. 
CONCLUSION 
The tax reimbursements at issue in this case were not payments for gas. Rather, they 
were allowed as an incentive, under strictly limited circumstances, by Section 110 of the NGPA. 
Therefore, to subject the reimbursements to royalty would be contrary to the incentive purposes 
of the NGPA. Moreover, even if the reimbursements could be considered to be payment for 
the sale of the Appellant's working interest share of the gas, the Appellants were prohibited by 
law from collecting reimbursements with respect to the State of Utah's royalty share of the gas. 
Therefore, reimbursements can form no part of the value of the government's royalty gas. Even 
if the Department could lawfully consider the value of the tax reimbursements received by others 
in determining its lessee's royalty obligations, it must also consider the corresponding costs 
incurred by those others in paying the taxes. Finally, the "federal floor" provision of the State's 
lease form should not be construed as incorporating the complex web of statutes, regulations, 
interpretations, and policies attendant to federal royalty valuations. Therefore, even under the 
government's numerous and varied theories, royalties cannot be collected on the tax 
reimbursements at issue in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Steven P. Williams 
ANR Production Company, CIG 
Exploration, Inc., Coastal Oil & Gas Corporation, 
Nine Greenway Plaza, 
Coastal Tower 
Houston, TX 77046-0995 
Telephone: (713) 877-6838 
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